CAT 2021 Slot 2 VARC Q5
- Verbal Ability and Reading Comprehension
- Reading Comprehension › Philosophy
- Hard
- Multiple choice
- CAT_2021_SLOT2_VARC_Q05
Passage · questions 5–8
It has been said that knowledge, or the problem of knowledge, is the scandal of philosophy. The scandal is philosophy's apparent inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know something or, indeed, that we know anything. Philosopher Michael Williams writes: 'Is it possible to obtain knowledge at all? This problem is pressing because there are powerful arguments, some very ancient, for the conclusion that it is not. Scepticism is the skeleton in Western rationalism's closet'. While it is not clear that the scandal matters to anyone but philosophers, philosophers point out that it should matter to everyone, at least given a certain conception of knowledge. For, they explain, unless we can ground our claims to knowledge as such, which is to say, distinguish it from mere opinion, superstition, fantasy, wishful thinking, ideology, illusion or delusion, then the actions we take on the basis of presumed knowledge - boarding an airplane, swallowing a pill, finding someone guilty of a crime - will be irrational and unjustifiable.
That is all quite serious-sounding but so also are the rattlings of the skeleton: that is, the sceptic's contention that we cannot be sure that we know anything at least not if we think of knowledge as something like having a correct mental representation of reality, and not if we think of reality as something like things as they are in themselves, independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions. For, the sceptic will note, since reality, under that conception of it, is outside our ken (we cannot catch a glimpse of things in themselves around the corner of our own eyes; we cannot form an idea of reality that floats above the processes of our conceiving it), we have no way to compare our mental representations with things as they are in themselves and therefore no way to determine whether they are correct or incorrect. Thus the sceptic may repeat (rattling loudly), you cannot be sure you 'know' something or anything at all – at least not, he may add (rattling softly before disappearing), if that is the way you conceive 'knowledge'.
There are a number of ways to handle this situation. The most common is to ignore it. Most people outside the academy and, indeed, most of us inside it are unaware of or unperturbed by the philosophical scandal of knowledge and go about our lives without too many epistemic anxieties. We hold our beliefs and presumptive knowledges more or less confidently, usually depending on how we acquired them (I saw it with my own eyes; I heard it on Fox News; a guy at the office told me) and how broadly and strenuously they seem to be shared or endorsed by various relevant people: experts and authorities, friends and family members, colleagues and associates. And we examine our convictions more or less closely, explain them more or less extensively, and defend them more or less vigorously, usually depending on what seems to be at stake for ourselves and/or other people and what resources are available for reassuring ourselves or making our beliefs credible to others (look, it's right here on the page; add up the figures yourself; I happen to be a heart specialist).
Question 5
The author of the passage is most likely to support which one of the following statements?
Show answer and solution
Answer: (A)
The scandal of philosophy is that we might not know anything at all about reality if we think of reality as independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions.
Solution
🎯 Question Analysis & Solution
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Question Type: Author's Agreement / Core Argument Identification
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Passage Reference:
"The scandal is philosophy's apparent inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know something or, indeed, that we know anything."
"...that is, the sceptic's contention that we cannot be sure that we know anything at least not if we think of knowledge as something like having a correct mental representation of reality, and not if we think of reality as something like things as they are in themselves, independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions. For, the sceptic will note, since reality, under that conception of it, is outside our ken... we have no way to compare our mental representations with things as they are in themselves and therefore no way to determine whether they are correct or incorrect. Thus the sceptic may repeat (rattling loudly), you cannot be sure you 'know' something or anything at all – at least not, he may add (rattling softly before disappearing), if that is the way you conceive 'knowledge'."
Logical Deduction
To identify the statement the author would support, we examine the conditional nature of the skeptic's argument articulated in Paragraph 2:
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The author defines the "scandal of philosophy" as our apparent inability to prove that we know anything at all.
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Crucially, the author clarifies that this scandal is entirely contingent upon a particular premise: "at least not if we think of reality as something like things as they are in themselves, independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions."
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Under this conception, because humans cannot observe reality independently of our own perceptual faculties, reality remains "outside our ken," making it impossible to compare mental representations to mind-independent things-in-themselves.
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Hence, if we adopt the premise that reality is completely independent of our perceptions, we are logically driven to the conclusion that we cannot know anything about reality.
Option 1 captures this central philosophical thesis with rigorous fidelity.
Correct Answer: Option 1
- Accurately reflects the central argument of Paragraph 2: the scandal of philosophy (the impossibility of certain knowledge) arises specifically when reality is defined as mind-independent things-in-themselves that transcend our perceptual faculties.
Option Elimination
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Option 2 ([Direct Contradiction / Opposite Meaning]): Paragraph 3 explicitly states the opposite—that our confidence in beliefs usually depends on how we acquired them ("usually depending on how we acquired them (I saw it with my own eyes; I heard it on Fox News...)").
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Option 3 ([Factual Distortion / Philosophical Misrepresentation]): Distorts the skeptic's position. The skeptic does not prescribe that we "should aim to know that reality independently"; rather, the skeptic asserts that knowing mind-independent reality is structurally impossible because we cannot step outside our perceptual mechanisms.
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Option 4 ([Unsupported Extrapolation / Conflation]): Conflates the philosophers' formal demand for epistemic justification in Paragraph 1 with the sociological description of belief formation in Paragraph 3. The passage never claims that widespread social consensus makes actions philosophically rational or justifiable.
Detailed explanation
📖 Passage Breakdown & Structure
Central Theme
An epistemological critique of the "scandal of philosophy"—the enduring inability of Western rationalism to justify claims of objective knowledge against radical skepticism. The passage examines how this crisis is manufactured by a representationalist view of knowledge (measuring mental representations against mind-independent reality), reveals why such skepticism is inescapable under those premises, and contrasts this theoretical deadlock with the pragmatic, socially reinforced ways humans actually maintain, evaluate, and defend beliefs in real life.
Paragraph-by-Paragraph Summary
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Paragraph 1: Introduces the "scandal of philosophy" (citing Michael Williams): the discipline's persistent inability to prove that knowledge is attainable, making skepticism the "skeleton in Western rationalism's closet." Explains why philosophers argue this matters to everyday life: without grounded knowledge that separates fact from illusion or delusion, critical practical actions (flying, medicine, legal judgment) would theoretically be irrational.
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Paragraph 2: Deconstructs the skeptic's argument under the representationalist framework. If knowledge requires an accurate mental representation of "things as they are in themselves" independent of human perception, objective verification is structurally impossible because humans cannot step outside their perceptual faculties to compare representations with unmediated reality. Crucially notes the skeptic's parting qualification: skepticism only binds us if we define knowledge in this specific representationalist way.
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Paragraph 3: Surveys how society actually handles this theoretical impasse, noting that the most common approach is simply to ignore it. Most individuals, both outside and inside academia, navigate life without epistemic paralysis, holding beliefs with confidence calibrated by provenance (source), social reinforcement (consensus among peers, authorities, and experts), personal stakes, and available evidential resources.
Tone and Author's Perspective
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Tone: Academic, philosophical, critically analytical, and subtly wry/ironic.
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Author's Perspective: The author maintains an incisive, philosophically literate vantage point that deflates abstract metaphysical anxieties. By personifying skepticism ("rattlings of the skeleton", "rattling softly before disappearing") and foregrounding pragmatic social epistemology, the author illuminates the gap between sterile philosophical representationalism and functional human practice.
Other questions in this set
- Q6. "we cannot catch a glimpse of things-in-themselves around the corner of our own eyes; we cannot form an idea of…
- Q7. According to the last paragraph of the passage, “We hold our beliefs and presumptive knowledges more or less…
- Q8. The author discusses all of the following arguments in the passage, EXCEPT:
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